Edouard Machery’s Doing Without Concepts boldly argues for the elimination of the term “concept” from psychological literature. His argument runs as follows: individuals possess many different kinds of concepts which have very few properties in common. These concepts are used in distinct cognitive processes, so the term “concept” should not be used in psychology, leaving more descriptive terms such as “exemplar” and “prototype” in its place. Nevertheless, Machery’s conclusion does not follow from the evidence he provides.
Machery’s treatment of the philosophical literature on concepts is inadequate. He argues that because psychologists and philosophers define “concepts” differently, the term “concept” is incommensurable between the two disciplines. Psychologists should not concern themselves with what the philosophers think and vice-versa. Yet Machery only considers one account to connect philosophy and psychology -- Christopher Peacocke’s “Simple Account”— before dismissing the endeavor altogether. This quick conclusion seems specious at best. Psychology has influenced philosophy and vice-versa, so there must be some overlap in the use of “concept”.
Machery also has trouble with following through on his intended goal of getting rid of “concept”. He defines the book’s thesis in the closing sentence as a “drastic conceptual change” (251), thereby slightly undermining his own idea of removing “concept” from psychological literature. His wording may be a minor slip, but he should have used some other term.
Finally, Machery’s thesis may have trouble being accepted by the psychological community. Another student interviewed Henry Roediger, a psychologist at Washington University in St. Louis, on Machery’s thesis. Roediger does not believe “concept” will ever leave the psychological vocabulary regardless of how many different kinds of concepts exist.
Machery sets his sights slightly too high in Doing Without Concepts, as his arguments and evidence do not support his drastic change.
Machery’s treatment of the philosophical literature on concepts is inadequate. He argues that because psychologists and philosophers define “concepts” differently, the term “concept” is incommensurable between the two disciplines. Psychologists should not concern themselves with what the philosophers think and vice-versa. Yet Machery only considers one account to connect philosophy and psychology -- Christopher Peacocke’s “Simple Account”— before dismissing the endeavor altogether. This quick conclusion seems specious at best. Psychology has influenced philosophy and vice-versa, so there must be some overlap in the use of “concept”.
Machery also has trouble with following through on his intended goal of getting rid of “concept”. He defines the book’s thesis in the closing sentence as a “drastic conceptual change” (251), thereby slightly undermining his own idea of removing “concept” from psychological literature. His wording may be a minor slip, but he should have used some other term.
Finally, Machery’s thesis may have trouble being accepted by the psychological community. Another student interviewed Henry Roediger, a psychologist at Washington University in St. Louis, on Machery’s thesis. Roediger does not believe “concept” will ever leave the psychological vocabulary regardless of how many different kinds of concepts exist.
Machery sets his sights slightly too high in Doing Without Concepts, as his arguments and evidence do not support his drastic change.